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Abstract
This paper explores how income distribution inuences market structure and a¤ects the eco-
nomic well-being of di¤erent groups. It shows that inequality may be good for the poor via a
trickle-down e¤ect operating through entry. I consider a general equilibrium model of monop-
olistic competition with free entry, heterogenous rms and consumers that share identical but
non-homothetic preferences. The general model is solved. The case of two types of consumers,
rich and poor, is considered in detail. I show that higher income inequality in the economy can
benet the poor. An increase in the personal income of the rich raises welfare of the poor, while
an increase in the fraction of the rich has an ambiguous impact on the poor: welfare of the poor
has an inverted U shape as a function of the fraction of the rich. At the same time, an increase
in the personal income of the rich together with a decrease in the fraction of the rich keeping the
aggregate income in the economy xed raises the well-being of the poor. I also analyze the e¤ect of
changes in market size and entry cost. I show that the rich gain more from an increase in market
size and lose more from an increase in the cost of entry than the poor.
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1 Introduction
What are the possible consequences of income redistribution for market structure, consumption allo-
cation, and welfare? As Atkinson and Bourguignon (2000) argue, "it is di¢ cult to think of economic
issues without distributive consequences and it is equally di¢ cult to imagine distributive problems
without some allocational dimension." There is a large empirical and theoretical literature that relates
income distribution and inequality to a number of social and economic outcomes1. Alesina and Rodrik
(1994) show that an increase in income inequality has a negative impact on economic growth (see also
Persson and Tabellini (1994)). Waldmann (1992) argues that the level of inequality is positively corre-
lated with infant mortality. Glaeser, Scheinkman and Shleifer (2003) suggest that high inequality can
negatively a¤ect social and economic progress through the subversion of institutions in the economy.
This paper develops a simple model that establishes another link between income distribution
and economic outcomes. I consider a general equilibrium model of monopolistic competition with
heterogenous rms and consumers. In traditional models of monopolistic competition, income dis-
tribution plays no role. This rests on two standard preference assumptions. First, when preferences
are identical and homothetic, it is well understood that the distribution of income does not a¤ect
equilibrium: only aggregate income matters. Second, when preferences are quasi linear, the presence
of a numeraire good eliminates the inuence of income distribution on equilibrium outcomes.
I assume that all consumers share identical but non-homothetic preferences. I introduce income
heterogeneity in the model by assuming that consumers di¤er in the e¢ ciency units of labor they
are endowed with. In models with homothetic preferences, any price change has the same impact
on all consumers regardless of whether consumers are identical or not. Non-homothetic preferences
and income heterogeneity imply that same price changes a¤ect di¤erent groups di¤erently. At the
same time, the presence of market power induces endogenous heterogenous mark-ups across rms,
which are in turn a¤ected by income distribution. Thus, changes in income distribution have di¤erent
consequences for di¤erent groups.
I adopt the preference structure from Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) and Matsuyama (2000).
The basic idea is that goods are indivisible, and potential consumers want to buy only one unit of
each good. This implies that, given prices, goods can be arranged so that consumers can be seen as
moving down some list in choosing what to buy. For example, in developing countries, consumers rst
buy food, then clothing, then move up the chain of durables from kerosene stoves to refrigerators, to
cars. Notice that the consumer utility can only be increased by the consumption of a greater number
of goods. Moreover, consumers with high income consume the same set of goods as consumers with
1See Atkinson and Bourguignon (2000) for more substantial literature review.
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low income, plus some others.
Only one rm produces each good. Goods di¤er in terms of the valuations that consumers attach
to them. By the valuation of a particular good, I mean the utility delivered to consumers from the
consumption of one unit of this good. Such di¤erences between goods generate ex-post heterogeneity
across rms, as rms enter the market before the valuations placed on their goods are realized. As
in Melitz (2003)2, there is free entry in the market. To enter the market, rms have to make costly
investments that are sunk. Once rms enter, they know the valuations attached to their goods. Firms
producing goods with high valuations stay in the market and compete in price, while rms with
su¢ ciently low valuations choose to exit. This and the preference structure lead to an endogenous
distribution of mark-ups, which is inuenced not only by market size, but also by the distribution
of income in the economy. Hence, the model incorporates two key features: imperfect competition
and non-homothetic preferences, which allow analyzing the consequences of changes in the income
distribution on pricing in the equilibrium, the market structure and, thereby, welfare of di¤erent
groups of consumers.
While the general model is established and solved, the heart of the paper focuses on the case of
two types of consumers: rich3 and poor. Depending on the valuations attached to the goods they
produce, rms are endogenously divided into three groups. Firms with high valuations choose to
serve all consumers; rms with medium valuations decide to sell only to the rich, while rms with low
valuations leave the market. I examine how this endogenous distribution of rms, rm mark-ups, and
individual welfare are a¤ected by income inequality, market size, and the cost of entry.
In particular, I analyze how income inequality inuences the well-being of the poor. I show that
higher income inequality in the economy can benet the poor via a trickle-down e¤ect operating
through entry. Higher inequality can cause more entry in the market, inducing greater competition
and lower mark-ups. As sources of income inequality, I consider changes in the income and the fraction
of the rich consumers. Remember that inequality is increasing in the income of the rich and has an
inverted U shape as a function of the fraction of the rich.
An increase in the income level of the rich has two e¤ects: redistribution of rms across the groups
and a higher number of rms entering the market, which results in tougher competition. As might be
expected, the rich whose incomes rise are better o¤. Due to additional entry the poor also gains. In
this manner, a higher income of the rich leads to higher welfare of the poor. This is reminiscent of the
trickle-down e¤ect in Aghion and Bolton (1997), who show that in the presence of imperfect capital
markets, the accumulation of wealth by the rich may be good for the poor. Similar results can be
2See also Melitz and Ottaviano (2005).
3The fraction of the rich is an exogenous parameter.
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observed, for example, in Melitz (2003) or Melitz and Ottaviano (2005). However, in these papers an
increase in the income of the rich has the same or no impact on mark-ups of all rms. In the present
paper I show that an increase in the income of the rich a¤ects di¤erent rms di¤erently. Mark-ups of
rms that sell their goods to all consumers fall, while mark-ups of rms that serve only the rich rise.
Another intriguing issue is to compare welfare of the poor in countries with di¤erent fractions of
the rich. What is better for the poor: tiny minority or vast majority of the rich? Keeping the same
personal incomes and mass of the consumers, an increase in the fraction of the rich has two opposite
implications for the poor. First, some rms that served all consumers choose to sell only to the rich.
Second, a larger fraction of the rich attracts more rms to the market. The former e¤ect hurts the
poor, while the latter one helps them. I show that if the fraction of the rich is small, then the positive
e¤ect prevails otherwise the opposite happens. Thus, welfare of the poor has an inverted U shape as a
function of the fraction of the rich. In contrast, in the previous literature4 an increase in the fraction
of the rich has an unambiguous impact on the welfare of the poor.
There is a common feature of both comparative statics mentioned above. An increase in the
personal income of the rich as well as an increase in the fraction of the rich raises the aggregate
income in the economy. To capture a pure redistribution e¤ect, I consider an increase in the personal
income of the rich together with a decrease in the fraction of the rich keeping the aggregate income
in the economy xed. Notice that these changes raise inequality in the economy. The previous results
state that while an increase in the personal income of the rich has a positive e¤ect on welfare of the
poor, a decrease in the fraction of the rich has an ambiguous impact. If the fraction of the rich is
large, both e¤ects work in the same direction and the poor are better o¤. However, if the fraction
of the rich is small, then one e¤ect is positive and the other one is negative. I show that the overall
impact on the welfare of the poor is still positive.
In this paper I also analyze the e¤ect of changes in market size and entry cost. An increase in market
size leads to tougher competition. Therefore, mark-ups of all rms fall and welfare of all consumers
rises. These results are similar to those in Melitz (2003) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2005). However,
there are some di¤erences. In the present model, there is no "love for variety". Welfare of a particular
individual depends only on her income and the valuation to price ratio of the goods consumed. Thus,
an increase in welfare is caused by a purely competitive e¤ect, which reduces rm mark-ups. Similarly,
an increase in entry cost induces lower competition, raises mark-ups, and, thereby, decreases welfare of
all consumers. What about relative welfare? Who gains more: the rich or the poor? I show that given
some plausible assumption about the distribution function of valuations, the rich gain more from an
increase in market size and lose more from an increase in entry cost than the poor.
4See the survey of literature below.
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The related literature in this area can be divided into three strands. First, there are papers that
consider monopolistic competition models with rm heterogeneity, but which assume homothetic or
quasi-linear preferences. Melitz (2003) develops a general equilibrium model with rm heterogeneity
and Dixit-Stiglitz preferences, which imply exogenous mark-ups. Melitz and Ottaviano (2005) exam-
ine a similar framework, but incorporate endogenous mark-ups considering a linear demand system.
However, in both these papers, the distribution of income does not play any role. In contrast, the
model presented here includes all the key features of the papers mentioned while also establishing a
connection between income distribution and the market structure.
The second group of papers, for instance Flam and Helpman (1987), Stokey (1991), and Mat-
suyama (2000), explores the implications of non-homothetic preferences in a perfectly competitive
environment for open economies. These papers mainly analyze the interaction between income distri-
bution and trade patterns. Since in a the perfectly competitive framework prices are una¤ected by
income distribution, some important economic mechanisms (such as entry and exit of rms) related
to income distribution, pricing, and market structure, are out of scope in these works.
Finally, the third group of papers deals with both monopolistic competition and non-homothetic
preferences. There is a set of papers written by Krishna and Yavas5, in which the role of indivisibilities
and market distortions is investigated. However, the impact of income distribution on market structure
is not considered in these papers. While Mitra and Trindade (2005) consider a model of monopolistic
competition with non-homothetic preferences, the way they introduce non-homothetic preferences has
the shortcoming that the share of income spent on a particular good is exogenous and depends on
personal income.
Closer to this paper is the work of Foellmi and Zweimueller (2004) that develops a general equi-
librium model with an exogenous mass of identical rms. In contrast, I consider heterogenous rms
and free entry in the market, which in turn implies endogeneity of the mass of potential producers
in equilibrium. Moreover, Foellmi and Zweimueller (2004) do not address welfare issues. They show
that, depending on the parameters of the model, an increase in income inequality has either no impact
on rm mark-ups or increases them. The present paper suggests that this is not necessarily the case;
in fact, an increase in income inequality a¤ects di¤erent rms di¤erently. Due to free entry, greater
income inequality may raise mark-ups for rms that sell their goods only to the rich and reduce
mark-ups for rms that sell their goods to all consumers.
Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) study how income inequality a¤ects the adoption of modern
technologies. In their model, prices and mark-ups are exogenous. In fact, Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny
5See Krishna and Yavas (2001), Krishna and Yavas (2004), and Krishna and Yavas (2005).
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(1989) leave the questions of competition, mark-ups, and welfare outside their analysis.
In the paper closest to this one, Foellmi and Zweimueller (2006) examine a dynamic variation of
Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989). The structure of the model is similar to the present one. Assum-
ing learning by R&D, they focus their analysis on the link between possible growth and inequality. In
contrast, I do not consider the learning by R&D spillover and explore the impact of income distribution
and inequality on the level of competition, mark-ups, and individual welfare.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic concepts of the general
model. Section 3 develops a special case with two types of consumers, rich and poor, and establishes
existence and uniqueness of equilibrium for this case. It also derives the implications of the distribution
of income on market structure and individual welfare. Section 4 extends the analysis to the general
case with N types of consumers, and Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
I consider a general equilibrium model of monopolistic competition with heterogenous rms and con-
sumers. The preference structure is adopted from Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) and Matsuyama
(2000).
2.1 Production
The timing of the model is as follows: rms choose whether to incur a xed cost, fe, or not to do so.
If a rm incurs the cost, then it obtains a draw b of the valuation of its good from the distribution
G(b) on [0; A]: This is meant to capture the idea that before they enter, rms do not know how well
they will end up doing, as they do not know how highly consumers will value their products. I assume
that G0(b) = g(b) exists. The valuation, b, is interpreted as the utility delivered to consumers from the
consumption of one unit of the good. Depending on the valuation they draw, rms choose to leave
the market or to stay. Firms that decide to stay compete in price with other rms. The only factor of
production is labor. I assume that marginal costs of production are the same for all rms and equal
to c, i.e., it takes c e¤ective units of labor (which are paid a wage of unity) to produce a unit of any
good.
Consumers di¤er in the number of e¢ ciency units of labor they are endowed with. I assume that
there are N types of consumers, indexed by n: A consumer of type n is endowed with In e¢ ciency
units of labor. I choose indices so that In > In 1. Let n be the fraction of type n consumers in
the aggregate mass L of consumers. Thus, the total labor supply in the economy in e¢ ciency units is
L
PN
i=1 iIi:
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2.2 Consumption
All consumers have the same non-homothetic preferences given by utility function
U =
Z
!2

b(!)x(!)d!,
where 
 is the set of available goods in the economy, b(!) is the valuation of good ! and x(!) 2 f0; 1g
is the consumption of good !: Each consumer owns a balanced portfolio of shares of all rms. Due to
free entry, the total prot of all rms is equal to zero in the equilibrium. This implies that the value of
any balanced portfolio is equal to zero. Thus, all consumers have the same wealth, while their incomes
vary with their productivity. To simplify the notation, I assume that consumers have equal shares of
all rms. Let  be the total prot of all rms in the economy. For given prices a type n consumer
maximizes Z
!2

b(!)x(!)d!
subject to the budget constraint Z
!2

p(!)x(!)d!  In + 
L
;
where p(!) is the price of good !. It is clear that utility maximization merely involves moving down
the list of products ordered by their valuation to price ratio, b(!)p(!) ; until all income is exhausted.
To build intuition, I rst consider the simple case when consumers have one of two possible pro-
ductivities.
3 A Special Case: Two Types of Consumers
There are two types of consumers: a high productivity and, thereby, high income type, and a low
income type. The productivity of a high income type is dened by IH , the productivity of a low
income type is IL. Given the preferences, all goods consumed by less productive consumers are also
consumed by more productive ones. Thus, goods in the economy can be divided into three groups:
the "poor" group includes goods that are consumed by both types of consumers; the "rich" group
includes goods that are consumed by more productive type only; nally, there is the group of goods
that are consumed by no one.
A rm that produces a good ! obtains prot of (p(!)   c)Q(!), where Q(!) is demand for good
!. If all consumers buy the good, then demand is L: If only the rich buy it, demand is HL, where
H is the fraction of a high income type. Thus, Q(!) 2 fL;HL; 0g.
Each rm takes the valuation to price ratio of all other rms as given and maximizes its prot.
The following proposition holds.
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Proposition 1 Even though all goods have di¤erent valuation to marginal cost ratios, goods from the
same group have the same valuation to price ratio in the equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose not. In this case, there exists some group, in which there are at least two goods with
di¤erent b(!)p(!) ratios. Since both goods belong to the same group, the rm that produces its good with
higher b(!)p(!) can raise its p(!) without a¤ecting the demand. This in turn would increase its prot.
Dene V1 as the valuation to price ratio of goods from the "poor" group, i.e., goods that are
consumed by both types of consumers, and V2 as valuation to price ratio of goods from the "rich"
group in the equilibrium. Here V1, V2 are endogenous parameters and V1 is strictly greater than V2.
Thus, if a rm with valuation b(!) sells to all consumers, then its price is equal to b(!)V1 and its prot
is given by
(p(!)  c)L =

b(!)
V1
  c

L;
while if the rm sells only to the rich, its prot is given by
(p(!)  c)HL =

b(!)
V2
  c

HL:
As V1 > V2, the rm chooses between selling to more people at a lower price and selling to fewer of
them, but at a higher price. Hence, the rm chooses p(!) 2 f b(!)V1 ;
b(!)
V2
g to maximize its prot, taking
V1 and V2 as given. It becomes obvious that in the equilibrium the price of good ! depends only on
b(!). Therefore, hereafter I omit the notation of ! and consider prices as a function of b.
Let bM be the unique solution of the equation
b
V1
  c

L =

b
V2
  c

HL: (1)
In the equilibrium the condition, HV2 <
1
V1
, is satised; otherwise

b
V2
  c

HL >

b
V1
  c

L for
any b  0 and all rms would choose to sell only to high income consumers, but this is impossible in
the equilibrium. This condition guarantees that
b
V1
  c

L 

b
V2
  c

HL if b  bM
b
V1
  c

L <

b
V2
  c

HL otherwise.
This means that if a rm draws b  bM ; then in the equilibrium it sells to both types of consumers,
otherwise it sells only to the rich or exits. A rm with valuation bM of its good is indi¤erent between
selling to all consumers and selling only to the rich (see Figure 1 ). Thus, even in the presence of
market power products have a natural hierarchy: consumers at rst buy goods with higher b.
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Figure 1: Prot Function
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Hereafter, without loss of generality, I assume that a rm with valuation bM sells to both types of
consumers. Let a function V (b) be dened by bp(b) : Then, in the equilibrium V (b) looks as in Figure
2, where bL  0 is a cuto¤ level such that rms drawn b < bL exit.
3.1 The Equilibrium
Let Me be the mass of rms that enter the market. One can think of Me as that there are Meg(b)
di¤erent rms with a particular valuation b.
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In the equilibrium, several conditions should be satised. First, as there is free entry in the market,
the ex-ante expected prots of rms have to be equal to zero. Second, the goods market clears. Since
the poor consume only goods from the "poor" group, the aggregate cost of the bundle of goods from
the "poor" group should be equal to the income of a poor consumer. Similarly, the aggregate cost of
the bundle of all available goods in the economy should be equal to the income of a rich consumer.
Denition 1 The equilibrium of the model is dened by the price function p(b) on b  bL, the cuto¤
level bL  0, bM , Me; and the valuation to price ratios V1; V2 such that
1) The ex-ante expected prots of rms are equal to zero.
2) The goods market clears.
Further, I derive equations that satisfy conditions mentioned above and prove that the equilibrium
of the model always exists and is unique. Let (b) be the variable prot of a rm with valuation b.
To nd the equilibrium, I express (b) and p(b) as functions of b; bL, bM and exogenous parameters.
Firms with valuation bL have zero prots, i.e.,

bL
V2
  c

HL = 0: This implies that bL = cV2 or
V2 =
bL
c : From (1) one can easily nd V1 as a function of bL and bM : Thus, the following lemma holds.
Lemma 1 In equilibrium
p(b) =
(
b
V1
= cb

H
bL
+ (1 H)bM

if b  bM
b
V2
= cb 1bL if b 2 [bL; bM )
;
(b) =
8<:

cb

H
bL
+ (1 H)bM

  c

L if b  bM
cb 1bL   c

HL if b 2 [bL; bM )
:
Since rms with valuation bM have the same prots from selling to all consumers and selling only
to the rich, the price function has a jump at bM ; i.e., to compensate for lower demand, rms raise
their prices (see Figure 3 ). This results in the nonmonotonicity of the price function.
The ex-ante prot of rms is equal to zero in the equilibrium. Using the results from Lemma 1 and
taking into account that rms with b < bL exit, I obtain
fe = (G(bM ) G(bL))
Z bM
bL

ct
1
bL
  c

HLdG2(t)

+
(1 G(bM ))
Z A
bM

ct

H
bL
+
(1  H)
bM

  c

LdG1(t)

;
where G2(t) =
G(t)
G(bM ) G(bL) and G1(t) =
G(t)
1 G(bM ) : Simple algebra shows that this equation can be
rewritten as follows.
fe
cL
+ 1 = HH(bL) + (1  H)H(bM ); (2)
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Figure 3: Price Function
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where H(x) = G(x) +
RA
x xdG(x)
x :
The goods market clearing condition implies that
IL +

L =Me
R A
bM
p(t)dG(t)
IH +

L =Me
R A
bL
p(t)dG(t)
: (3)
At the same time, free entry in the market means that  = 06: Thus, dividing the second line by the
rst one and using Lemma 1, I obtainR bM
bL
tdG(t)R A
bM
tdG(t)
=

IH
IL
  1

H +
bL(1  H)
bM

:
Hence, given the exogenous parameters IH ; IL; H ; fe; c; L; and the distribution of draws G(),
one can nd endogenous bM and bL from the system of equations, which is given by
R bMbL tdG(t)RA
bM
tdG(t)
=

IH
IL
  1

H +
bL(1 H)
bM

fe
cL + 1 = HH(bL) + (1  H)H(bM )
: (4)
The following lemma states the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium.
Lemma 2 The system of equations (4) has a unique solution.
Proof. In the appendix.
Once bM and bL are found, V1 and V2 can be derived from Lemma 1. Finally, the mass of rms
can be found from (3) :
6 It can be easily checked, using (2) :
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3.2 Comparative Statics and Welfare
Before describing the comparative statics of the model, I focus on consumer welfare and income
inequality in the economy.
3.2.1 Welfare
Welfare of a poor consumer is equal to Me
R A
bM
tdG(t): At the same time, from (3) Me =
ILRA
bM
p(t)dG(t)
.
This implies that
Wp = ILV1:
Welfare of a poor consumer naturally rises with an increase in either her income or the valuation to
price ratio of goods she consumes.
Similarly, welfare of a rich consumer is given by
Wr = ILV1 + (IH   IL)V2:
As the rich consume the same bundle of goods as the poor plus some others, welfare of the rich is
equal to welfare of the poor plus additional welfare from consumption of goods from the "rich" group,
which is in turn equal to income spent on these goods multiplied by their valuation to price ratio.
Notice that all changes in individual welfare are divided into two components: an income e¤ect
and a price e¤ect. The price e¤ect is determined by changes in V1 and V2, which depend on the level
of competition inside the groups of goods. The income e¤ect is determined by changes in exogenous
IL and IH :
3.2.2 Income Inequality
As the income inequality in the economy, I consider the variance of the income distribution. Dene
AG as the aggregate income per capita in the economy. Then,
AG = HIH + (1  H)IL:
The variance of the income distribution, V AR, is given by
V AR = H(1  H) (IH   IL)2 = ( 1
H
  1) (AG  IL)2 :
Thus, the income inequality is increasing in IH   IL and has an inverted U shape as a function of H .
Moreover, if one considers an increase in IH together with a decrease in H keeping AG xed, then
this raises the income inequality.
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In the next sections, I look at several comparative statics of the model and their impact on the
market structure and individual welfare. In particular, I focus on changes in H and IH that increase
the income inequality in the model.
3.2.3 Changes In Individual Incomes
Consider an increase in the income of the rich IH . Two opposite e¤ects inuence welfare of the poor.
First, since IH increases, some rms that sold their goods to all consumers nd it more protable to
sell only to the rich. Second, a higher income of the rich results in higher expected prots of rms;
this in turn implies that more rms enter the market, inducing tougher competition. While the former
e¤ect raises the prices of goods from the "poor" group, the latter one reduces them. I show that an
overall impact is to decrease the prices of the goods from the "poor" group; as a result, V1 rises. This
implies that an increase in IH raises welfare of the poor. Finally, both e¤ects mentioned above raise
bM .
What about the prices of goods from the "rich" group? While a higher income of the rich allows
rms that sell only to the rich to increase their prices, more entry causes more competition and,
thereby, leads to a decrease of all prices. It can be shown that the former e¤ect prevails over the latter
one; that is, the prices of the goods from the "rich" group increase. This results in V2 and bL falling.
Recall that welfare of the rich is given by Wp + (IH   IL)V2. I show that in spite of a decrease in V2,
the rich are better o¤ from an increase in IH .
Similar logic works if one considers changes in IL: An increase in IL raises bL,Me, V2 and decreases
bM , V1. Again, all consumers are better o¤. The following proposition summarizes the results above.
Proposition 2 An increase in the income of either type of consumers increases welfare of all con-
sumers.
Proof. In the appendix.
Thus, an increase in the income of either type of consumers has a positive spillover on welfare of
the other consumers. To better understand the intuition, I think of short run and long run e¤ects.
Consider an increase in IH : In the short run, when rms can not exit or enter, i.e., Me is xed, an
increase in IH obviously raises welfare of the rich but reduces welfare of the poor, as some rms switch
from selling to all consumers to selling only to the rich. In the long run, more rms enter the market
inducing tougher competition and lower prices. This raises welfare of the poor. As a result, in the
long run the poor are better o¤, while in the short run the poor are worse o¤.
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Similar results can be observed, for example, in Melitz (2003) or Melitz and Ottaviano (2005).
However, in these papers an increase in the income of the rich has the same impact on mark-ups of
all rms, while I show that an increase in the income of the rich a¤ects di¤erent rms di¤erently.
3.2.4 Changes In The Fraction of The Rich
Next, consider an increase in the fraction of the rich H : Since the mass of rich consumers in the
economy rises, rms expect higher prots. This leads to an increase in the number of rms that
entering the market, i.e., Me rises. Because of tougher competition, rms with low valuations exit.
Due to the higher fraction of the rich, there are some rms sold their goods to all consumers, which
decide to sell only to the rich. Thus, bL and bM increase.
The impact on welfare of the poor is rather complicated. Two opposite e¤ects inuence welfare
of the poor. The rst one is an increase in Me: it induces higher competition, reduces prices, and,
thereby, positively a¤ects Wp. The second e¤ect is associated with the fact that some rms start
selling only to the rich, while before these rms sold to the poor too. This e¤ect reduces competition
among rms that produce goods from the "poor" group, raising their prices; i.e., it has a negative
impact on Wp: What e¤ect is stronger is ambiguous. I prove that if H is close to 0, then welfare of
the poor rises given an increase in H ; while if H is close to 1, then Wp decreases.
The case, when H is inside (0; 1) interval, is much more complicated to analyze. Therefore, I
make numerical examples. As a distribution of draws, I take the power distribution7. For particular
sets of exogenous parameters, I consider di¤erent H 2 [0; 1] and calculate corresponding equilibrium.
In all cases I consider, welfare of the poor has an inverted U shape as a function of H . This is also
conrmed by the analytical results I derived. The next proposition summarizes these results.
Proposition 3 Welfare of the poor has an inverted U shape as a function of the fraction of the rich.
Proof. In the appendix.
3.2.5 Changes In The Income and The Fraction of The Rich Keeping The Aggregate
Income Fixed
There is a common feature for both comparative statics mentioned above. An increase in the personal
income of the rich as well as an increase in the fraction of the rich raises the aggregate income in the
economy. To capture a pure redistribution e¤ect, I consider an increase in the personal income of the
rich together with a decrease in the fraction of the rich keeping the aggregate income in the economy
xed.
7The distribution function is G(b) =
 
b
A
k
, where b 2 [0; A] and k > 0:
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Remember that while an increase in IH always raises welfare of the poor, a decrease in H has an
ambiguous impact on the poor. If H is high enough, then both e¤ects increase welfare of the poor.
If the fraction of the rich is small, then these e¤ects work in the opposite directions. In this case, I
show that if H is close to zero, then the overall impact on the welfare of the poor is still positive.
The intuition is as follows. Given the changes in the income and fraction of the rich, there is a trade
o¤: a lower number of the rich versus an increase in their income. It appears that this redistribution
raises expected prots of rms and, thereby, increases the number of rms entering the market; that
is, rms prefer a lower number of the rich, who have higher incomes. Due to more entry, welfare of
the poor rises.
Thus, I show that in two extreme cases (H  1 and H  0) the poor are better o¤ from
the redistribution considered. Again, the case with H being inside (0; 1) interval is much more
complicated to analyze. To make numerical examples, I take the power distribution as the distribution
of draws. For particular sets of exogenous parameters, keeping the same aggregate income, I consider
di¤erent H , IH and calculate corresponding equilibrium. In all cases I consider, Wp and Me are
decreasing functions with respect to H . Thus, the numerical examples are partially conrmed by the
analytical results. The next proposition summarizes these ndings.
Proposition 4 An increase in the income of the rich together with a decrease in the fraction of the
rich keeping the aggregate income xed raises welfare of the poor and the number of rms entering the
market.
Proof. In the appendix.
3.2.6 Changes In The Cost of Entry and Market Size
An increase in the cost of entry fe reduces the expected prots of rms. This in turn decreases
the number of rms entering the market and reduces competitive pressure. Ex-post variable prots
increase and rms that left the market before earn positive prots now and stay in the market. Because
of less competition, some rms that sold their goods only to the rich nd it more protable now to sell
to all consumers. Hence, the cuto¤ level bL, bM , andMe decrease. Due to the reduction in competitive
pressure, all rms, except rms that sold to the rich before but decide to sell to all consumers now,
increase their prices. Both V1 and V2 fall, welfare of all individuals decreases. Thus, an increase in the
cost of entry has an overall negative impact on welfare.
The opposite e¤ect (but of the same form, see (4)) takes place if the size of the economy L increases.
An increase in L results in an increase in the expected prots of rms. This leads to the higher number
of rms entering the market and tougher competition. In spite of an increase in demand, rms with
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low valuations leave the market. All rms, except rms that switch to selling only to the rich and
increase their prices, reduce their prices. The cuto¤ level bL, bM , andMe rise. Welfare of all individuals
increases. Thus, an increase in the mass of consumers positively a¤ects individual welfare.
Finally, any changes in fe and L such that entry cost per capita,
fe
L , remains the same do not cause
any changes in bL; bM ; Me, and individual welfare. Two opposite e¤ects completely compensate each
other. The following proposition summarizes these ndings.
Proposition 5 Larger countries and countries with lower entry cost have higher individual welfare.
That is, an increase in feL reduces welfare of all individuals.
Proof. In the appendix.
These results are similar to those in Melitz (2003) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2005). At the same
time, the present model implies that changes in market size or the cost of entry have di¤erent impacts
on di¤erent types of consumers. Who gains or loses more from an increase in feL : the rich or the poor?
In the next section I consider an impact of an increase in feL on relative welfare of the rich with respect
to the poor.
Relative Welfare Relative welfare of the rich with respect to the poor is given by WrWp = 1+
IH IL
IL
V2
V1
.
It can be rewritten as follows
Wr
Wp
= 1 +
IH   IL
IL

H + (1  H) bL
bM

: (5)
Given an increase in feL , bL and bM move in the same direction. From (5) one can see that changes
in feL a¤ect
Wr
Wp
only through the ratio bLbM : Moreover, any changes in
fe
L have no impact on the goods
market equilibrium condition (see below). Thus, exploring the impact of feL on relative welfare, one
has to analyze the moving of bLbM along the goods market equilibrium curveR bM
bL
tdG(t)R A
bM
tdG(t)
  IH   IL
IL

H + (1  H) bL
bM

= 0: (6)
In the appendix I show that to determine the sign of

bL
bM
0
bL
along (6), one needs to know the sign of
x2g(x)RA
x tdG(t)
0
x
: If

x2g(x)RA
x tdG(t)
0
x
is always greater than zero, then

bL
bM
0
bL
is always positive, otherwise
the sign of

bL
bM
0
bL
can be either and depends on the exogenous parameters of the model.
Recall that feL is negatively correlated with bL. The following proposition formalizes the ndings
above.
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Proposition 6 If

x2g(x)RA
x tdG(t)
0
x
> 0 for any x 2 [0; A], then the rich gain more from an increase in
market size and lose more from an increase in entry cost than the poor. That is, an increase in feL
reduces WrWp .
Proof. In the appendix.
The sign of

x2g(x)RA
x tdG(t)
0
x
has a strong economic interpretation. If it is positive, then g(x) does not
decrease too fast; i.e., the probability of getting higher values of b does not decrease too fast with b:
Limiting the analysis to the cases when

x2g(x)RA
x tdG(t)
0
x
is always positive8, one derives that the rich lose
more from an increase in feL than the poor. To better understand the intuition, I separately consider
two markets. The rst market is the market for goods from the "poor" group, while the second one
is the market for goods from the "rich" group. Given an increase in feL , fewer rms enter the both
markets, this decreases bL and bM . Then, due to less competitive pressure, some rms that sold their
goods only to the rich switch to selling to all consumers. This e¤ect obviously decreases bM and
also reduces competition in the second market. This allows rms with low valuations to survive and
results in bL falling. Since rms that moved from the second market to the rst one have relatively
high valuations compared with rms that "survived", the prices of these goods are relatively high.
This implies that bL has to fall by more than bM to compensate for the di¤erence in the prices.
4 A General Model
Now, consider the general case withN types of consumers. Consumers di¤er in the number of e¢ ciency
units of labor they are endowed with. A consumer of type n is endowed with In e¢ ciency units of
labor. I choose indices so that In > In 1. Here n is the fraction of consumers of type n in the
aggregate mass L of consumers.
The equilibrium of the general model is very similar to the equilibrium in the simple case above. All
goods that are consumed by less productive type of consumers are also consumed by more productive
type. Thus, goods in the economy are divided into N + 1 groups. Goods belong to group k = 1::N
if they are only consumed by consumers with type n  k. Goods belong to group N + 1 if they are
consumed by nobody. Firms with the highest valuations b sell their goods to all types of consumers,
while goods with less valuation are not available for the poorest consumers. Obviously, goods from
the same group have the same valuation to price ratio. Let Vk be the valuation to price ratio of goods
from group k. Then, in the equilibrium V (b) looks as in Figure 8, where bk is such that rms with
bk are indi¤erent between selling to consumers with type n  k and selling to consumers with type
8For example, the set of power distributions satises this condition.
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Figure 4: Valuation to Price Function: A General Model
-
6
VN
V1
V2
VN 1
b20
V (b)
bbN 1bN b1 A
n  k + 1; for example, rms with b1 are indi¤erent between selling to all consumers and selling to
everyone except the poorest ones. This means that bN is a cuto¤ level, i.e., rms with b < bN exit.
Without loss of generality, I assume that rms with bk choose to sell to consumers with type n  k:
As before, let Me be the mass of rms that enter the market and draw valuation of their goods.
Denition 2 The equilibrium of the model is dened by the price function p(b) on b  bN , Me; the
sequences fVkgk=1::N and fbkgk=1::N such that
1) The ex-ante expected prots of rms are equal to zero.
2) The goods market clears.
Let k(b) and pk(b) be the prot and the price of a rm with valuation b 2 [bk; bk 1),9respectively.
Then, the following lemma holds.
Lemma 3 In equilibrium
pk(b) =
b
Vk
= bc
PN
i=k
i
biPN
i=k i
:
k(b) = cL
PN
i=k
i(b  bi)
bi
:
Proof. In the appendix.
9Let b0 = A:
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In the equilibrium, the expected prot of rms is equal to zero. This implies that
fe =
PN
k=1(G(bk 1) G(bk))E(k(b)jb 2 [bk; bk 1)) ()
fe
cL
+ 1 =
PN
k=1 kH(bk):
Moreover, the goods market clears. That is, the aggregate cost of the bundle of goods from group k
should be equal to income of a consumer of type k. Taking into account that the aggregate prot of
rms  is equal to zero in the equilibrium, I obtain
Ik =Me
Z A
bk
p(t)dG(t) k = 1::N:
Thus, there is the system of N + 1 equations
Ik =Me
R A
bk
p(t)dG(t) k = 1::N
fe
cL + 1 =
PN
k=1 kH(bk)
(7)
with N + 1 unknowns: fbkgk=1::N and Me.
Proposition 7 The model has a unique equilibrium.
Proof. The proof is based on the fact that the system of equations (7) has a unique solution. Details
are in the appendix.
Thus, I prove the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium with N types of consumers. At the
same time, the results above imply that there exists a unique equilibrium for the case, when there is a
continuous distribution of e¢ ciency units of labor among consumers. Since any continuous distribution
can be approximated by the sequence of discrete distributions, one can interpret equilibrium in the
continuous case as the limit of equilibria in the discrete cases. Thus, in the continuous case, the
function V (b) = bp(b) is increasing on [b
c
L; b
c
M ) and at on [b
c
M ; A], where b
c
L and b
c
M are endogenous
and depend on the exogenous parameters of the model and the distribution of e¢ ciency units of
labor10.
Unfortunately, due to mathematical di¢ culties, it is very hard to solve the model explicitly in the
continuous case. To solve the problem explicitly, I need to make an assumption about the distribution
of e¢ ciency units of labor. I assume that this distribution has a constant hazard rate. That is,
I consider the set of exponential distributions on [s;1), where s  0 is the minimum endowment
of e¢ ciency units of labor11. However, in this case, there are shortcomings. Since the maximum
endowment of e¢ ciency units of labor is innity, there is no exit in the model, i.e., the cuto¤ bcL
100  bcL < bcM  A
11All details are available in the appendix.
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is equal to zero. Moreover, the price function p(b) is decreasing in b, when b is close to zero, and
p(0) = 1. At the same time, this partial case gives us a simple straightforward explanation of why
some luxury goods, even with low valuations, are so expensive: they are bought only by very rich
consumers.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, I consider a general equilibrium model of monopolistic competition with heteroge-
nous rms and consumers. The model incorporates two key features: imperfect competition and
non-homothetic preferences, which allow us to analyze the consequences of changes in the income dis-
tribution on pricing in the equilibrium, the market structure and, thereby, welfare of di¤erent groups
of consumers. The general model is set up and solved. Due to technical di¢ culties in exploring
comparative statics in the general case, I focus on the case of two types of consumers: rich and poor.
This framework leads to interesting theoretical results that help to understand the impact of income
inequality on individual well-being. In particular, I analyze how income inequality inuences the well-
being of the poor. I show how greater income inequality in the economy can benet the poor. Greater
inequality can cause more entry in the market inducing greater competition and lower mark-ups. This
in turn benets poor consumers. As sources of income inequality, I consider changes in the income
and the fraction of the rich consumers. This model also allows us to analyze the e¤ect of changes
in market size and entry cost. An increase in market size leads to tougher competition. Therefore,
mark-ups of all rms fall and welfare of all consumers rises. Similarly, an increase in entry cost induces
lower competition, raises mark-ups, and, thereby, decreases welfare of all consumers. Moreover, I nd
that given plausible assumptions, the rich gain more from an increase in market size and lose more
from an increase in entry cost than the poor.
There are a number of plausible extensions of this model. For example, it would be interesting to
consider an open economy version of the model. In this case, the paper can be modied in two ways.
First, one can explore a model of trade between two countries with di¤erent income distributions and
examine how this di¤erence a¤ects the trade pattern. Second, it would be interesting to consider the
case when income distribution is endogenous and, for example, a¤ected by the level of openness. I
leave these issues for future work.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2
Consider R bM
bL
tdG(t)R A
bM
tdG(t)
=

IH
IL
  1

H +
bL(1  H)
bM

: (8)
Let bM = F1(bL) be an implicit solution of (8). Obviously, F1(bL) is strictly increasing in bL:Moreover,
A > F1(bL) > bL: Hence, if bL tends to A, then F1(bL) also tends to A:
Now, consider
fe
cL
+ 1 = HH(bL) + (1  H)H(bM ): (9)
By analogy, let bM = F2(bL) be an implicit solution of (9) : Because H() is strictly decreasing, F2(bL)
is also strictly decreasing in bL: Moreover, H(A) = 1: This implies that H(F2(A)) =
fe
cL(1 H) +1 > 1.
Therefore, F2(A) < A: Let bAL be such that F2(b
A
L) = A, then H(b
A
L) =
fe
cLH
+ 1 > 1, i.e., bAL < A:
Thus, the solution of (4) exists and is unique (see Figure 5 ).
Proof of Lemma 3
Demand for a good from group k is equal to L
PN
i=k i: From the denition of fbkgk=1::N :

bk
Vk
  c
PN
i=k i =
bk
Vk+1
  c
PN
i=k+1 i:
By induction, PN
i=k i
Vk
=
1
V1
 Pk 1i=1 ibi c: (10)
Figure 5: Equilibrium
-
6
A
0
bM
bLb
A
L A
F1(bL)
F2(bL)
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Thus, from (10): N (b) =

b
VN
  c

NL =
bL
V1
  bLPN 1i=1 ibi c   cNL: Since bN is a cuto¤ level,
N (bN ) = 0: This implies that 1V1 = c
PN
i=1
i
bi
: From (10): 1Vk =
c
PN
i=k
i
biPN
i=k
i
k = 1::N . Finally, simple
algebra shows that
pk(b) = bc
PN
i=k
i
biPN
i=k i
;
k(b) = cL
PN
i=k
i(b  bi)
bi
:
Proof of Proposition 7
Using Lemma 3, the system of equations (7) can be rewritten as follows128><>:
fe
cL + 1 =
PN
k=1 kH(bk)
Ik Ik 1
cMe
=
PN
i=k
i
biPN
i=k
i
R bk 1
bk
tdG(t) k = 1::N
: (11)
Consider k = N . Then,
IN   IN 1
cMe
=
1
bN
Z bN 1
bN
tdG(t). (12)
Given Me and bN 1, there exists a unique solution bN (bN 1;Me) of the equation (12) : The function
bN (bN 1;Me) is strictly increasing in Me and bN 1: Moreover, MebN (bN 1;Me) =
IN IN 1
c
R bN 1
bN
tdG(t)
is strictly
increasing in Me. Consider k = N   1. Then,
IN 1   IN 2
cMe
=
N
bN
+
N 1
bN 1
N + N 1
Z bN 2
bN 1
tdG(t): (13)
Given Me and bN 2, there exists a unique solution bN 1(bN 2;Me) of the equation (13) : The func-
tion bN 1(bN 2;Me) is strictly increasing in bN 2: Since MebN (bN 1;Me) is strictly increasing in Me,
bN 1(bN 2;Me) is strictly increasing in Me: Finally,

N
bN
+
N 1
bN 1

Me
N+N 1 =
IN 1 IN 2
c
R bN 2
bN 1 tdG(t)
is strictly increas-
ing in Me: Using the backward induction, it can be proved that for any k = 1::N , there exists a
unique solution bk(bk 1;Me) of the equation13
Ik Ik 1
cMe
=
PN
i=k
i
biPN
i=k
i
R bk 1
bk
tdG(t) such that bk(bk 1;Me)
is strictly increasing in bk 1 and Me:
This implies that for any Me, there exists a unique solution fbk(Me)gk=1::N of the system of
equations Ik Ik 1cMe =
PN
i=k
i
biPN
i=k
i
R bk 1
bk
tdG(t) k = 1::N: And for any k = 1::N , bk(Me) is strictly increasing
12Let I0 be equal to zero.
13Recall that b0 = A:
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Figure 6: An Increase in IH : Equilibrium
-
6
6
A
IH
0
bM
bLA
in Me: Hence, (11) is equivalent to
fe
cL
+ 1 =
PN
k=1 kH(bk(Me)) and (14)
bk = bk(Me) k = 1::N:
Consider D(Me) =
PN
k=1 kH(bk(Me)): H(x) is a decreasing function. This means that D(Me) is
decreasing in Me: Moreover, if Me is close to zero, then bN (Me) is close to zero and, thereby, D(Me)
is large enough14: At the same time, if Me is large, then for any k = 1::N , bk(Me) is close to A and
D(Me) 
PN
k=1 kH(A) = 1 <
fe
cL + 1: Thus, there exists a unique solution Me of (14) : This implies
that there exists a unique solution of (7) :
Comparative Statics
In this section I use simplifying notation:
R y
x means
R y
x tdG(t):
Proof of Proposition 2
An increase in IH causes the curve F1(bL) to shift up , while the curve F2(bL) remains the same. Thus,
bL goes down and bM goes up (see Figure 6 ). The impact on welfare is not so obvious. Rewrite (8)
and (9) as follows 
J1 = (1  H)cLH (bM ) + HcLH (bL)  fe   cL = 0
J2 = IL
R bM
bL
  (IH   IL)

H +
bL(1 H)
bM
 R A
bM
= 0
: (15)
14H(0) =1:
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Notice that equilibrium values of bL and bM solve (15). Thus,
@bM
@IH
=
@J2
@IH
@J1
@bL
@J1
@bM
@J2
@bL
  @J2@bM
@J1
@bL
> 0 (16)
@bL
@IH
=
  @J2@IH
@J1
@bM
@J1
@bM
@J2
@bL
  @J2@bM
@J1
@bL
< 0: (17)
Consider 1V1 =
Hc
bL
+ (1 H)cbM : One can see that

Hc
bL
+ (1 H)cbM
0
IH
=  Hc
(bL)
2
@bL
@IH
  (1 H)c
(bM )
2
@bM
@IH
: From
(16) and (17)
 Hc
(bL)
2
@bL
@IH
  (1  H)c
(bM )
2
@bM
@IH
=
c2LH(1  H) @J2@IH
@J1
@bM
@J2
@bL
  @J2@bM
@J1
@bL

H 0 (bM )
(bL)
2  
H 0 (bL)
(bM )
2

:
Recall that H 0(x) =  
R A
x tdG(t)
x2
< 0: Thus,
 Hc
(bL)
2
@bL
@IH
  (1  H)c
(bM )
2
@bM
@IH
=
c2LH(1  H) @J2@IH
@J1
@bM
@J2
@bL
  @J2@bM
@J1
@bL
R A
bL
  R AbM
(bL)
2 (bM )
2 :
Since @J1@bM
@J2
@bL
  @J2@bM
@J1
@bL
> 0 and @J2@IH < 0,

Hc
bL
+ (1 H)cbM
0
IH
< 0. Therefore, (V1)
0
IH
> 0: This implies
that an increase in IH causes an increase inWp = ILV1: AsWp =Me
R A
bM
and bM increases, an increase
in IH raises Me and Wr =Me
R A
bL
:
Similarly, an increase in IL causes the curve F1(bL) to shift down, while the curve F2(bL) remains
the same. Thus, bL goes up and bM goes down. To analyze the impact on welfare, I use the same
technique as before. Since Wr = Me
R A
bL
tdG(t) and IH = Me
R A
bL
p(t)dG(t), Wr =
IH
RA
bL
tdG(t)RA
bL
p(t)dG(t)
=
IH
RA
bL
c
bL
R bM
bL
+

cH
bL
+
c(1 H )
bM
 RA
bM
: One can see that

c
bL
Z bM
bL
+

cH
bL
+
c(1  H)
bM
Z A
bM
0
IL
=
= c
 
@bL
@IL
(
 g(bL) 
R bM
bL
+H
R A
bM
(bL)
2
)
+
@bM
@IL
(1  H)
(
g(bM )bM

1
bL
  1
bM

 
R A
bM
(bM )
2
)!
:
The sign of (Wr)
0
IL
is the same as the sign of
R A
bL
tdG(t)
0
IL
R A
bL
p(t)dG(t) 
R A
bL
p(t)dG(t)
0
IL
R A
bL
tdG(t):
Simple algebra shows thatZ A
bL
tdG(t)
0
IL
Z A
bL
p(t)dG(t) 
Z A
bL
p(t)dG(t)
0
IL
Z A
bL
tdG(t) =
=
c2L(1  H)2 @J2@IL
@J1
@bM
@J2
@bL
  @J2@bM
@J1
@bL
R bM
bL
R A
bL
R A
bM
(bL)
2 (bM )
2 + c(1  H)(bM   bL)

@bL
@IL
g(bL)
bM
Z A
bM
 @bM
@IL
g(bM )
bL
Z A
bL

:
25
Figure 7: An Increase in H : Equilibrium
-
6
6
-
A
H
0
bM
bLA
Since @bL@IL > 0,
@bM
@IL
< 0, and @J2@IL > 0, (Wr)
0
IL
> 0: As Me = WrR A
bL
tdG(t)
, an increase in IL raises Me and,
thereby, Wp.
Proof of Proposition 3
An increase in H causes the curve F1(bL) to shift up and the curve F2(bL) to shift to the right around
45 degree line (see Figure 7 ). Thus, bM goes up. The impact on bL is not so obvious. There are
two opposite e¤ects: the upward shift of F1(bL) decreases bL, but the shift of the F2(bL) increases bL.
Further, I explore which e¤ect is stronger.
From (15)
@bM
@H
=
  @J1@H
@J2
@bL
+ @J2@H
@J1
@bL
@J1
@bM
@J2
@bL
  @J2@bM
@J1
@bL
> 0
@bL
@H
=
  @J1@bM
@J2
@H
+ @J2@bM
@J1
@H
@J1
@bM
@J2
@bL
  @J2@bM
@J1
@bL
:
To determine the sign of @bL@H , I examine
  @J1
@bM
@J2
@H
+
@J2
@bM
@J1
@H
= cL
 
(H (bL) H (bM )) @J2
@bM
  (1  H)
(bM )
2 (IH   IL)

1  bL
bM
Z A
bM
2!
:
Consider
@J2
@bM
= ILbMg (bM ) + (IH   IL)

H +
bL(1  H)
bM

bMg (bM ) +
bL(1  H)
(bM )
2
Z A
bM

:
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The second equation in (15) can be rewritten as IL =
(IH IL)

H+
bL(1 H )
bM
 RA
bMR bM
bL
: Thus,
@J2
@bM
= (IH   IL)
 
H +
bL(1  H)
bM

bMg (bM )
R A
bLR bM
bL
+
bL(1  H)
(bM )
2
Z A
bM
!
: (18)
Therefore,
  @J1@bM
@J2
@H
+ @J2@bM
@J1
@H
cL (IH   IL) = (H (bL) H (bM ))

H +
bL(1  H)
bM

bMg (bM )
R A
bLR bM
bL
+
+
(1  H)
(bM )
2
Z A
bM

G(bL)bL +
Z A
bL
 G(bM )bL  
Z A
bM

> 0;
since bM > bL and G(bL)bL+
R A
bL
 G(bM )bL 
R A
bM
is increasing in bM and equal to zero when bM = bL:
Thus, @bL@H > 0:
Next, I explore the impact of an increase in H on welfare of the poor. Recall that welfare of
the poor is given by IL
c

H
bL
+
(1 H )
bM
 : To determine the sign of (Wp)0H , one needs to know the sign of
H
bL
+ (1 H)bM
0
H
= 1bL   1bM  

H
(bL)
2
@bL
@H
+ (1 H)
(bM )
2
@bM
@H

: Consider
H
(bL)
2
@bL
@H
+
(1  H)
(bM )
2
@bM
@H
=

@J1
@H

H
@J2
@bM
(bL)
2  
(1 H) @J2@bL
(bM )
2

+ @J2@H

(1 H) @J1@bL
(bM )
2  
H
@J1
@bM
(bL)
2

@J1
@bM
@J2
@bL
  @J2@bM
@J1
@bL
:
From (15)
@J2
@bL
=  ILbLg (bL)  (IH   IL) (1  H)
bM
Z A
bM
=   (IH   IL)
0@bLg (bL)

H +
bL(1 H)
bM
 R A
bMR bM
bL
+
(1  H)
bM
Z A
bM
1A : (19)
Thus, from (18) and (19)
H
@J2
@bM
(bL)
2  
(1  H) @J2@bL
(bM )
2 = (IH   IL)

H +
bL(1  H)
bM

P1;
where P1 =
 
HbMg(bM )
RA
bL
(bL)
2
R bM
bL
+
(1 H)bLg(bL)
RA
bM
(bM )
2
R bM
bL
+ (1 H)
bL(bM )
2
R A
bM
!
: Moreover,
(1  H) @J1@bL
(bM )
2  
H
@J1
@bM
(bL)
2 =  
(1  H)HcL
(bM )
2 (bL)
2
Z bM
bL
:
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Thus,
H
(bL)
2
@bL
@H
+
(1  H)
(bM )
2
@bM
@H
=
@J1
@H
(IH   IL)

H +
bL(1 H)
bM

P1   @J2@H
(1 H)HcL
(bM )
2(bL)
2
R bM
bL
@J1
@bM
@J2
@bL
  @J2@bM
@J1
@bL
:
Using the expressions for @J1@H and
@J2
@H
, one can easily derive that
H
(bL)
2
@bL
@H
+
(1  H)
(bM )
2
@bM
@H
=
cL (IH   IL)

(H (bL) H (bM ))

H +
bL(1 H)
bM

P1 +

1  bLbM

P2

@J1
@bM
@J2
@bL
  @J2@bM
@J1
@bL
;
where P2 =
(1 H)H
(bM )
2(bL)
2
R bM
bL
R A
bM
:
Consider @J1@bM
@J2
@bL
  @J2@bM
@J1
@bL
: From (18) and (19)
@J1
@bM
@J2
@bL
  @J2@bM
@J1
@bL
cL (IH   IL) =

H +
bL(1 H)
bM

R bM
bL
P3 +
(1  H)
R A
bM
tdG(t)
(bM )
2 P4;
where P3 =
(1 H)bLg(bL)
RA
bM
2
(bM )
2 +
HbMg(bM )
RA
bL
2
(bL)
2 and P4 =
(1 H)
RA
bM
bM
+
H
RA
bL
bL
: Therefore,

H
bL
+
(1  H)
bM
0
H
=
1
bL
  1
bM
 
(H (bL) H (bM ))

H +
bL(1 H)
bM

P1 +

1  bLbM

P2
H+
bL(1 H )
bM
R bM
bL
P3 +
(1 H)
RA
bM
(bM )
2 P4
=

H +
bL(1 H)
bM

P3

1
bL
  1bM

  (H (bL) H (bM ))P1
R bM
bL

 
H+
bL(1 H )
bM
R bM
bL
P3 +
(1 H)
RA
bM
(bM )
2 P4
!R bM
bL
+

1
bL
  1bM
 (1 H)P4 RAbM  bL(bM )2P2
(bM )
2

 
H+
bL(1 H )
bM
R bM
bL
P3 +
(1 H)
RA
bM
(bM )
2 P4
! :
Simple arithmetic shows that (1 H)P4
R A
bM
 bL (bM )2 P2 =
R A
bM
2
(1 H)
bL

H +
bL(1 H)
bM

. Thus,

H
bL
+
(1  H)
bM
0
H
=

H +
bL(1 H)
bM


H+
bL(1 H )
bM
R bM
bL
P3 +
(1 H)
RA
bM
(bM )
2 P4
P5;
where P5 =

1
bL
  1bM
R A
bM
2
(1 H)
bL(bM )
2 +
 
P3

1
bL
  1
bM
R bM
bL
  (H (bL) H (bM ))P1
!
: Using the expres-
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sions for P1 and P3, it is not di¢ cult to obtain that
P5 =
(1  H)
R A
bM
(bM )
2
 
1
bL
+
bLg (bL)R bM
bL
! 
G(bM ) G(bL) 
R bM
bL
bL
!
+
H
R A
bL
(bL)
2
bMg (bM )R bM
bL
 
G(bM ) G(bL) 
R bM
bL
bM
!
:
One can see that the sign of

H
bL
+ (1 H)bM
0
H
is the same as the sign of P5: As bM > bL, G(bM )  
G(bL)  
R bM
bL
bL
< 0 and G(bM )   G(bL)  
R bM
bL
bM
> 0. Hence, if H is close enough to zero, then
H
bL
+ (1 H)bM
0
H
< 0; that is, (Wp)
0
H
> 0. However, if H is close enough to one, then

H
bL
+ (1 H)bM
0
H
>
0. This implies that (Wp)
0
H
< 0. It appears much more complicated to determine the sign of P5 for
all other values of H 2 (0; 1). It is di¢ cult to examine the strict monotonicity of P5 with respect to
H , as the equilibrium values of bM and bL depend on H .
Now, I examine the impact of an increase in H on welfare of the rich given by 1c
 
IL
H
bL
+
(1 H )
bM
 + (IH   IL) bL
!
.
Thus,
c (Wr)
0
H
=
(IH   IL) @bL@H

H
bL
+ (1 H)bM
2   IL HbL + (1 H)bM 0H
H
bL
+ (1 H)bM
2 :
To nd the sign of (Wr)
0
H
, one needs to nd the sign of (IH   IL) @bL@H

H
bL
+ (1 H)bM
2 IL HbL + (1 H)bM 0H .
Using the previous results,
(IH   IL) @bL
@H

H
bL
+
(1  H)
bM
2
  IL

H
bL
+
(1  H)
bM
0
H
=
= (IH   IL) @bL
@H

H
bL
+
(1  H)
bM
2
  IL

H +
bL(1 H)
bM


H+
bL(1 H )
bM
R bM
bL
P3 +
(1 H)
RA
bM
(bM )
2 P4
P5:
Using the expressions for @bL@H and P5 derived above, one can obtain that to prove the positive sign of
(Wr)
0
H
, it is enough to prove that
(IH   IL)

H
bL
+
(1  H)
bM

(H (bL) H (bM ))  IL
bL
 
G(bM ) G(bL) 
R bM
bL
bM
!
> 0:
This is equivalent to
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IL
bL
 R bM
bLR A
bM
(H (bL) H (bM )) 
 
G(bM ) G(bL) 
R bM
bL
bM
!!
> 0 ()
IL
R A
bL
bL
 
1R A
bM
(H (bL) H (bM ))  1
bL
+
1
bM
!
> 0:
For any bL < bM ,
(H(bL) H(bM ))RA
bM
  1bL + 1bM > 0. Thus, (Wr)
0
H
is always greater than zero. Since
(Wr)
0
H
> 0, (bL)
0
H
> 0 and Wr = Me
R A
bL
, the mass of rms entering the market goes up, i.e.,
(Me)
0
H
> 0:
Proof of Proposition 4
In this section I consider an increase in IH together with a decrease in H keeping the aggregate
income xed. The aggregate income per capita, AG, is given by HIH + (1   H)IL. This implies
that IH =
AG (1 H)IL
H
or H (IH   IL) = AG  IL. Using the expression for IH , I rewrite (15)

J1 = (1  H)cLH (bM ) + HcLH (bL)  fe   cL = 0
J2 = IL
R bM
bL
  (AG  IL)

1 + bL(1 H)HbM
 R A
bM
= 0
: (20)
Hence, it is necessary to nd the impact of a decrease in H on welfare of the poor given new
equilibrium equations (20). I use the same technique as in the previous case. The only di¤erence is
that @J2@H changes. Thus,

H
bL
+
(1  H)
bM
0
H
=
1
bL
  1
bM
 
@J1
@H
(IH   IL)

H +
bL(1 H)
bM

P1   @J2@H
(1 H)HcL
(bM )
2(bL)
2
R bM
bL
@J1
@bM
@J2
@bL
  @J2@bM
@J1
@bL
:
Using the expressions for @J1@H and
@J2
@H
, one can derive

H
bL
+
(1  H)
bM
0
H
=
1
bL
  1
bM
 
(H(bL) H(bM ))

H +
bL(1 H)
bM

P1   (1 H)(bM )3bL
R A
bM
R bM
bL
H+
bL(1 H )
bM
R bM
bL
P3 +
(1 H)
RA
bM
(bM )
2 P4
:
Using the expressions for P1, P3, P4 and making some simplications, one can obtain

H
bL
+
(1  H)
bM
0
H
=

H
bL
+ bL(1 H)bM
 (1 H) RAbM
(bM )
2 (G(bM ) G(bL)) + P6


H+
bL(1 H )
bM
R bM
bL
tdG(t)
P3 +
(1 H)
RA
bM
(bM )
2 P4
;
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Figure 8: An Increase in fe: Equilibrium
-
6

6
A
fe
0
bM
bLA
where P6 =
(1 H)
RA
bM
(bM )
2
bLg(bL)R bM
bL

bL (G(bM ) G(bL)) 
R bM
bL

+
H
RA
bL
bL
bMg(bM )R bM
bL
 
G(bM ) G(bL) 
R bM
bL
bM
!
.
Thus, if H is high enough, then P6 > 0 and

H
bL
+ (1 H)bM
0
H
> 0: That is, welfare of the poor rises
with a decrease in H . This is also conrmed by the fact that given high H both an increase in
IH and a decrease in H have the positive impact on welfare of the poor. However, if H is close
to zero, then these two e¤ects work in the opposite direction. Consider

H
bL
+ (1 H)bM
0
H
when H
is close to zero. Notice that from (20) limH!0 bL(H) = 0 and limH!0
bL(H)
H
is some positive
constant. Since for any density function g(), limx!0 xg(x) = 0, limH!0 P6 > 0. This implies that
H
bL
+ (1 H)bM
0
H=0
> 0; that is, welfare of the poor goes up with a decrease in H .
Finally, consider (bM )
0
H
=
  @J1
@H
@J2
@bL
+
@J2
@H
@J1
@bL
@J1
@bM
@J2
@bL
  @J2
@bM
@J1
@bL
:
The numerator is equal to
cL(IH IL)
RA
bM
bM
 
 
RA
bL
bL
+ (H(bL) H(bM ))
 
bLg(bL)(HbM+bL(1 H))R bM
bL
+ 1  H
!!
.
Thus, the sign of (bM )
0
H=0
is equal to the sign of H(bL) H(bM ) 
RA
bL
bL
, which is negative: Recall
that Wp =Me
R A
bM
, this implies that (Me)
0
H=0
< 0:
Proof of Proposition 5
An increase in fe causes the curve F2(bL) (see the proof of Lemma 2 ) to shift down and to the left,
while the curve F1(bL) remains unchanged. Therefore, bL and bM go down (see Figure 8). Since
Wp =
IL
Hc
bL
+
(1 H )c
bM
and Wr = Wp +
IH IL
c bL, one can see that Wp and Wr decrease. Me, which is
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equal to WpR A
bM
, also falls.
Similarly, an increase in L causes the curve F2(bL) to shift up and to the right, and the curve
F1(bL) remains unchanged. Thus, bL and bM go up. Me, Wp, and Wr increase.
Finally, any changes in fe and L such that
fe
L remains the same do not a¤ect F2(bL) and F1(bL):
This implies that bL and bM do not change. As a result, Me, Wp, and Wr remain unchanged.
Proof of Proposition 6
I show that if

x2g(x)RA
x tdG(t)
0
x
> 0 for any x, then

bM
bL
0
bL
< 0 along
Z bM
bL
 

IH
IL
  1

H +
bL(1  H)
bM
Z A
bM
= 0:
Simple algebra shows that
@bM
@bL
=
bLg(bL) +
R bM
bL
H+
bL(1 H )
bM
 (1 H)
bMRA
bLRA
bM
bMg(bM ) +
bL(1 H)
(bM )
2
R bM
bL
H+
bL(1 H )
bM
 :

bM
bL
0
bL
=
@bM
@bL
bL bM
(bL)
2 is less than zero if and only if
@bM
@bL
bL   bM < 0. One can derive that
@bM
@bL
bL   bM < 0 ()
bLg(bL) +
R bM
bL
H+
bL(1 H )
bM
 (1 H)
bMRA
bLRA
bM
bMg(bM ) +
bL(1 H)
(bM )
2
R bM
bL
H+
bL(1 H )
bM

bL
bM
< 1 () (bL)
2 g(bL)R A
bL
<
(bM )
2 g(bM )R A
bM
.
The Continuous Distribution of E¢ ciency Units of Labor
I assume that there is a distribution F () on [s; S] (with a density function f()) of e¢ ciency units of
labor. That is, given the mass L of consumers, there are F (x)L consumers with income less or equal to
x. Dene V (b) = bp(b) . From the main body of the paper one knows that V (b) is increasing on [b
c
L; b
c
M )
and at on [bcM ; A], where b
c
L and b
c
M are endogenous and depend on the exogenous parameters of the
model and the distribution of e¢ ciency units of labor. I assume that V (b) is di¤erentiable on [bcL; b
c
M ).
Finally, without loss of generality, I also assume that L = 1.
Consider a particular rm with valuation b. If b 2 [bcM ; A], then demand for this good is equal to
one and p(b) = bV (bcM )
, since V (b) is at on [bcM ; A]. Suppose b 2 [bcL; bcM ) and this rm imposes the
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price p of its good. Then, given V (b) in the equilibrium, s+
R bcM
V  1

b
p
Mep(t)dG(t) is total spending on
goods, which are bought before the considered good, goods that have higher valuation to price ratios.
This implies that demand for this good is equal to 1   F
 
s+
R bcM
V  1

b
p
Mep(t)dG(t)
!
. Thus, in the
equilibrium rms with b 2 [bcL; bcM ) solve the following maximization problem
max
p
(p  c)
 
1  F
 
s+
Z bcM
V  1

b
p
Mep(t)dG(t)
!!
:
The rst order condition implies that
1  F
 
s+
R bcM
V  1

b
p
Mep(t)dG(t)
!
f
 
s+
R bcM
V  1

b
p
Mep(t)dG(t)
! = (p  c) bMep

V  1

b
p

g

V  1

b
p

p2V 0

V  1

b
p
 :
This equation should be satised for any b 2 [bcL; bcM ) in the equilibrium. That is, the price function
p(b) on [bcL; b
c
M ) solves the following di¤erential equation
1  F

s+
R bcM
b Mep(t)dG(t)

f

s+
R bcM
b Mep(t)dG(t)
 = (p(b)  c) bMeg (b)
p(b)V 0 (b)
; (21)
where V (b) = bp(b) : Using the solution of (21), free entry condition, and the goods market equilibrium,
one can nd bcL, b
c
M , and Me in the equilibrium.
However, it is very hard to nd the solution of (21) in general. To simplify the problem, I assume
that F (x) = 1  e (x s) on [s;1): This implies that
1 F

s+
R bcM
b Mep(t)dG(t)

f

s+
R bc
M
b Mep(t)dG(t)
 = 1 :Thus,
1

= (p(b)  c) bMeg (b)
p(b)V 0 (b)
()
V 0 (b) = Me (b  cV (b)) g (b) : (22)
Since the maximum endowment of e¢ ciency unit of labor is innity, there is no exit and bcL = 0. Using
the initial condition V (0) = 0 and (22), one can derive
V (b) =
1
c

b  e MecG(b)
Z b
0
eMecG(t)dt

:
Finally,
p(b) =
cb
b  e MecG(b) R b0 eMecG(t)dt :
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From the goods market equilibrium one can obtain that s =
R A
bcM
Mep(t)dG(t) =
Me
V (bcM )
R A
bcM
tdG(t).
Using this equation and free entry condition, one can ndMe and bcM . In the simplest case with s = 0,
bcM = A and Me can be found from
fe =
Z A
0
(p(b)  c) e Me
RA
b p(t)dG(t)dG(b):
Notice that limb!0 p(b) =1. This means that the goods with lowest valuations have the highest
prices.
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